Published 2025-12-29 | Version v1.0
Working PaperOpenPublished

Permanent Presence under Uncertainty

A Partially Observable Game-Theoretic Framework for Unmanned Systems, Cost–Frequency Dynamics, and Strategic Stability

Description

This working paper develops a partially observable game-theoretic framework for unmanned systems that reframes permanent presence as a strategic condition under uncertainty rather than a platform-centric capability. It formalizes permanent presence through a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG), extends Cost–Distance–Frequency (CDF) logic by treating frequency as an adversary-facing random variable, and links observability, tempo, survivability, entropy, and verification to strategic stability and AI-enabled arms control.

Abstract

The operational advantage of unmanned systems is increasingly derived not from superior precision or predictive accuracy, but from their ability to sustain presence while resisting low-cost opponent inference. This paper develops a formal framework that conceptualizes permanent presence as a strategic condition rather than a platform-centric capability, reframing it as a portfolio under uncertainty. Building on a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) formulation, the analysis models the structural tension between observability, operational tempo, and survivability, and extends a Cost–Distance–Frequency (CDF) framework by treating frequency as an adversary-facing random variable rather than a controllable constant. The paper further explores the implications of this shift for strategic stability, verification, and AI-enabled arms control, arguing that uncertainty itself has become a central stabilizing—and destabilizing—factor in contemporary unmanned conflict.

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Keywords

  • Permanent presence
  • Unmanned systems
  • Partially Observable Stochastic Game
  • POSG
  • Cost–Distance–Frequency framework
  • CDF framework
  • cost–frequency dynamics
  • strategic stability
  • adversarial inference
  • belief entropy
  • uncertainty management
  • operational tempo
  • survivability
  • AI-enabled arms control
  • verification under uncertainty
  • autonomous systems
  • unmanned conflict
  • presence efficiency
  • AI governance
  • audit-by-design

Subjects

  • Strategic Studies
  • Unmanned Systems
  • AI-Enabled Conflict
  • Game Theory
  • Partially Observable Stochastic Games
  • Cost–Frequency Dynamics
  • Strategic Stability
  • Arms Control and Verification
  • AI Governance
  • Defense Modeling

Recommended citation

Wu, S.-Y. (2025). Permanent presence under uncertainty: A partially observable game-theoretic framework for unmanned systems, cost–frequency dynamics, and strategic stability. EPINOVA. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18081107. DOI: To be assigned after Crossref membership approval.

APA citation

Wu, S.-Y. (2025). Permanent presence under uncertainty: A partially observable game-theoretic framework for unmanned systems, cost–frequency dynamics, and strategic stability. Global AI Governance and Policy Research Center, EPINOVA LLC. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18081107. DOI: To be assigned after Crossref membership approval.

Alternate identifiers

SchemeIdentifierDescription
DOI10.5281/zenodo.18081107Zenodo/DataCite DOI from early ORCID-derived metadata record and recommended citation in the PDF
ORCID put-code201017438ORCID Public API record identifier from early metadata
File namePermanent Presence under Uncertainty.pdfSource PDF file name
Short titlePermanent Presence under UncertaintyShort form of the working paper title

Related works

RelationIdentifierTypeDescription
Related EPINOVA work developing CDF-based sustained presence and cost-frequency logic10.5281/zenodo.18095271
Related EPINOVA work on unmanned systems, C-UAS assessment, and auditable defense evaluation10.5281/zenodo.18090017

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